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Abstract 
Julian Jaursch: Regional interest representation in the EU: A qualitative intra-national 
comparison among German states 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
The guiding research questions for this paper are: What channels of direct 
supranational interest representation do German states use on the European level and how? If 
there is variance among German states, how might different channel preferences be 
explained? Independent variables explored are size, resources, an East-West divide and 
conflicts of interest with the federal level. 
The theoretical framework will be provided by the multi-level governance approach 
and research on regional authority within the EU. The qualitative empirical basis is a set of 
30 semi-structured interviews conducted in late 2011 with German state officials working in 
Brussels and Berlin. 
An analysis of how German states represent their EU interests in the various channels 
is offered. Overall, it will be seen that there is not a lot of intra-national variance between 
German states in what channels they use but that socio-economic factors play a role in how 
they utilize these channels. 
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1. Introduction 
The 16 German states are usually lumped together when talking about regional interest 
representation towards the European Union (EU). They are considered to be “well funded, 
strongly institutionalized, entrenched within their respective states, and active in the 
European arena” (Hooghe & Marks, 1996, p. 74), thus belonging to the “first league” 
(Tatham, 2008, p. 507) among European regions or even stemming from a completely 
different planet (Christiansen, 1996, p. 101). 
 Yet, some variance in interest representation among German states could be expected 
considering socio-economic differences between them such as unemployment rates (Statistik 
der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2012), expenditures for education (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2011a, p. 35) or the structure of agriculture (Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, 2007). But in 
the past, “[m]ost of the analysts of the regional level in the EU focused on the differences of 
regional actors across member states much more than they conceptualized differences 
between regional or subnational actors of individual member states.” (Bauer, 2006, p. 23)  
This article offers an intra-national view of German states with regards to European 
interest representation. The two guiding research questions are: What channels of interest 
representation do German states use on the European level and how? If there is variance 
among German states, how might different channel preferences be explained? The dependent 
variable is thus channel use by German states. 
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While German states can also represent their interests in the domestic arena, I focus 
primarily on direct interest representation in Brussels. Theoretically, research in this area is 
still lagging behind (Tatham, 2008, p. 498). Practically, states more clearly show their 
undiluted interests in Brussels than in the constitutionally fixed and compromise-seeking 
environment of German federalism. 
The intra-national approach is adopted to deviate from the common international or 
interregional comparative method. While it may only provide insights into one EU member 
state, the very narrow and controlled setting allows for the testing of various possible 
explanations for channel use. These independent variables I examine are the states’ size and 
resource richness, an East-West divide and conflicts of interest with the national level. 
 I will lay out briefly the multi-level governance (MLG) approach as the theoretical 
background to my research questions. In addition to this, German states’ powers with regards 
to EU policy-making will be presented. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive history or 
discussion of either the MLG concept or German states’ relationship with the federal 
government and the EU. Rather, I will map out some theoretical reference points for my 
empirical analysis. This central analysis will offer an in-depth examination of German states’ 
EU interest representation in Brussels, focusing on the different channels to the union. One 
major finding is that there is no variance in what channels the states use. How they are 
utilized, though, varies and this variance will be explored against the backdrop of the 
independent variables and the empirical findings from the interviews. 
  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and State of the Art Report 
2.1 The EU’s Multi-level Governance System 
Rejecting the idea that the EU is exclusively dominated by member states’ central 
governments, proponents of the MLG approach claim that “the state no longer monopolizes 
European level policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests” as “decision-making 
competencies are shared by actors at different levels” (Marks, Hooghe & Blank, 1996, p. 
346). Early descriptions originated in the field of structural policy (Marks, 1992; 1993; for 
criticism see Jeffery, 2000, p.7; Palmer, 2003, p. 365) but today MLG structures can be 
observed in many different European policy fields (George, 2004, p. 107; Hooghe, Marks & 
Schakel, forthcoming, pp. 4, 11). 
 
Accounting for the regional level 
One defining characteristic of MLG is the very acknowledgement of the importance of 
regions. From the various interpretations of the term region (Bauer & Börzel, 2010, p. 253; 
Eurostat, 2007; Loughlin, 1996, pp. 146-148; Münch, Meerwaldt & Fischer, 2002), the 
following minimal definition corresponds well with German states and is thus used in this 
paper: “A region refers to a given territory having a single, continuous, and non-intersecting 
boundary. Subnational regions are intermediate between local and national governments. A 
regional government is a set of legislative and executive institutions responsible for 
authoritative decision  making.” (Hooghe, Marks & Schakel, 2010, p. 4) 
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The conceptualization of MLG is partly due to the realization in the early 1990s that 
“subnational governments are being mobilized in unconventional ways” (Marks, 1992, p. 
221; also 1993, p. 407). Complex networks and negotiations between interconnected local, 
regional, national and supranational governments have led to “[t]he centralization of 
authority in a continental polity and the decentralization of authority in regions” (Hooghe et 
al., forthcoming, p. 2). This, in turn, means that no one level of government has absolute 
power to make decisions and solve conflicts: “[T]he hierarchy of levels of governance is 
being eroded.” (George, 2004, p. 123) It is precisely this interconnectedness of multiple 
governments that is touched upon when considering how German states represent their 
European interests. State-centric approaches, on the other hand, tend to uphold the primacy 
of the national government and downplay the influence of regional actors on the European 
level (Tatham, 2011, pp. 54-55). 
At the same time, criticism has to be mentioned regarding the fact that MLG tends to 
overstate the influence of subnational actors (George, 2004, pp. 118-122; Tatham, 2011, p. 
56). More fundamentally, it has been questioned whether MLG is even its own theory or not 
merely “a more comprehensive successor to neofunctionalism” (George, 2004, p. 112). Yet, 
if in the same thought it is recognized that MLG does not include neofunctionalism’s main 
element, functional spillover (p. 112), the justification for this criticism can be called into 
doubt as well. While MLG might not provide a theoretical framework for explaining 
European integration as a whole (Elias, 2008, p. 486), it is “a theory of what sort of 
organization the European Union is” (George, 2004, p. 125). 
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Subnational mobilization 
In the MLG perspective, states are conceived not as actors but as a set of institutions which, 
in turn, shape the opportunity structure for political actors (Marks, 1996, p. 22; Marks et al., 
1996, pp. 347-348). Such actors within state institutions may make decisions based on party 
political policy preferences. So, in fact, government leaders, as politicians, might sometimes 
deliberately transfer authority away from the central state. Reasons for shifting 
responsibilities in such a way include government leaders wanting to appease certain 
constituencies, to win the next election or to insulate a certain policy so they can influence it 
after their tenure is over (George, 2004, pp. 113-114; see also Marks, 1996, pp. 25-34; Marks 
et al., 1996, pp. 349-350). This opens up the possibility for regions to actively engage in the 
decision-making process.  
Analyzing the EU policy cycle, Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank found 
strong indicators for the previously described actor-centered MLG system: for example, the 
vital role the Commission plays both in shaping the agenda and in policy implementation, the 
weak role of the member state dominated European Council, the existence of regional 
lobbying groups, the expanded use of qualified majority voting and the co-decision 
procedure as well as the independent European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Marks et al., 1996, 
pp. 356-371). Against a state-centrist reading of EU politics, this MLG system allows for 
“multiple points of access for interests, while it privileges those interests with technical 
expertise that match the dominant style of EU policy-making.” (p. 372) 
These access points have not always been given, though, as the EU’s MLG structure 
just developed in the 1980s and is not a stable system (Marks et al., 1996, pp. 372-373). Only 
in the 1960s did the Commission come up with regional policies and only in the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 were regions granted a considerable part in EU decision-making. European 
 6  
regional policy was mostly aimed at reducing economic disparities but it lacked serious 
supranational commitments until the 1988 reform of the structural policy which gave the 
Commission a much-expanded role (Bauer & Börzel, 2010, pp. 254-256). 
Regarding subnational mobilization, the MLG approach has been criticized for a 
perceived top-down view to mobilization (Jeffery, 2000, p. 8) as well as a focus on extra-
state mobilization (1996a, p. 214; 2000, p. 7). However, even early literature on the MLG 
system has included various kinds of subnational mobilization (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe & 
Marks, 1996), countervailing this criticism. 
 
Mixed effects of integration on regions 
There is a danger of equating subnational mobilization with subnational influence (George, 
2004, pp. 123-124; Tatham, 2008, p. 494), when it is, in fact, unclear what influence 
European integration has on regions. 
Three possible scenarios for EU influence in a multi-level setting exist (Carter & 
Pasquier, 2010; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006; see also Knodt, 2002, pp. 213-215): Either the 
EU empowers regions, disempowers regions or has no effect at all. The EU could provide 
opportunities for regions through the Commission’s regional policy and through structural 
funds. Additionally, decentralization could be aided because regions institutionalize their 
interest representations on the EU level and form transnational networks (Carter & Pasquier, 
2010, pp. 298-300). Opponents of this interpretation hold that centralization may occur 
because regions may lose legislative authority and are turned into mere administrative units 
(pp. 300-301). Testing what effect EU legislation has on the decision-making of three Dutch 
subnational authorities, Frederik Fleurke and Rolf Willemse have found that the EU does 
impact subnational authorities but that this effect might be both enabling and hampering 
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(2006, p. 81). It has also been argued that due to the increased number of veto players in a 
MLG setting, efficient decision-making might be hindered (Benz, 2000, p. 30). 
While the MLG concept recognizes the regional level as a viable actor, it does not 
assume that there is a unitary level of regional politics or convergence among European 
regions. Rather, regions in Europe continue to vary in institutional and territorial structure 
(Bauer & Börzel, 2010, p. 254; Hooghe & Marks, 1996, p. 91; Hooghe et al., 2010; 
forthcoming, p. 5; Jeffery, 2000, p. 3). In the beginning, it was contested that MLG considers 
both inter-regional and intra-regional variety but research in both fields has emerged 
(George, 2004, p. 117). 
 
2.2 German States in the EU’s Multi-level Governance System 
In Germany, the different levels of authority are the federal level, the 16 states (Bundesländer 
or Länder, singular Bundesland or Land), the districts and the municipalities. This paper 
focuses on German states only, because they “monopolize power sharing with the federal 
government” (Hooghe et al., 2010, p. 145) and because in contrast to districts and 
municipalities, they handle their individual representational activities in Brussels. 
In European policy-making, German states’ domestic influence is today 
institutionalized in the Bundesrat procedure. The Bundesrat is the chamber of the German 
legislature made up of the Länder governments (for an introduction, see Reuter, 2009). It has 
the right to put forth legally binding statements to the federal government if EU legislation 
touches upon policy areas in which the Länder have exclusive competences in Germany’s 
federal system (Große Hüttmann & Knodt, 2000, p. 3; Moore & Eppler, 2008, p. 492; Nass, 
1989, pp. 177-178; Rowe, 2011, pp. 60-61; Suszycka-Jasch & Jasch, 2009, pp. 1235-1236). 
 8  
 In the early decades of the EU, it was almost exclusively the federal level which was 
responsible for European policies. Länder were to be informed by the federal government 
about major EU proposals in the procedure of forwarding legal initiatives 
(Zuleitungsverfahren) and later gained minor participatory rights through the participatory 
procedure (Länderbeteiligungsverfahren) (Große Hüttmann & Knodt, 2000, p. 3; Moore & 
Eppler, 2008, pp. 491-492; Suszycka-Jasch & Jasch, 2009, pp. 1233-1235). Their only own 
source of information was the Länder observer (Länderbeobachter): This position, dating 
back to 1958 but formalized in 1988, is a joint post of all Länder and provides information 
from the Council, the Commission and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the 
Bundesrat (Der Beobachter der Länder bei der Europäischen Union, 2012; Hooghe, 1995, p. 
184; Knodt, 2002, p. 218; Loughlin, 1996, p. 179; Rowe, 2011, pp. 61-62). 
 
Subnational mobilization I: From the “third level”… 
The discussions surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, are the prime example 
for German states’ mobilization in a MLG setting. The EU not only negotiated with the 
federation but also with the Länder. And the Länder, additionally, were in talks with the 
federation themselves. Substantial changes concerning the states’ attitude and the formal 
rules in both the domestic and the European arena were the result. 
Regarding the change in attitude, the Länder in the late 1980s pushed for more 
thorough reforms of the EU decision-making process. At home, the German states were in a 
fairly strong position vis-à-vis the federal government due to the fact that the Maastricht 
Treaty would require amendments to the German Basic Law which are subject to Bundesrat 
approval (Moore & Eppler, 2008, p. 492; Münch et al., 2002). This made considerable 
constitutional changes possible. On the European level, the Länder were vying for more 
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inter-regional cooperation under the slogan of a “Europe of the regions” (Loughlin, 1996, p. 
151; Suszycka-Jasch & Jasch, 2009, p. 1238). They were attempting to rally a broad legion 
of regions together in order to establish a third level of regional governance in the EU 
(Jeffery, 1996c, pp. 261-262). 
Domestically, the Länder achieved a change in the Basic Law in their favor (Jeffery, 
1996b, pp. 60-61). The introduction of article 23 (for an English translation, see Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2010, pp. 28-30) and the follow-up Law on the Cooperation of the Federation and 
the Länder in Matters relating to the European Union (Bundesrat, 2010a; Suszycka-Jasch & 
Jasch, 2009, pp. 1242-1246) made the German states into veto players: At least in certain 
policy fields, they could now co-determine Germany’s position in the EU and send a regional 
representative to the Council of Ministers (Gunlicks, 2005, p. 1290; Jeffery, 1996c, pp. 257-
261; 2007b, pp. 20-22; Knodt, 2002, p. 217; Moore & Eppler, 2008, pp. 492-493; for more 
detailed analyses of article 23, see Münch et al., 2002; Palmer, 2003, pp. 369-370; Suszycka-
Jasch & Jasch, 2009, pp. 1239-1241). With this so-called Europe Article, article 24 granting 
the federation sole power to transfer sovereignty was partly overwritten. 
Considering this, it is unsurprising that the federal government has not been viewing 
article 23 favorably. It argues that such strong inclusion of the Länder in the EU policy-
making process severely hinders Germany’s flexibility at the negotiation table because it 
necessitates comprehensive and time-consuming coordination among different domestic 
actors (Jeffery, 2007b, p. 20; Moore & Eppler, 2008, p. 498). This marks the European 
dimension of German federalism’s joint-decision trap (Benz, 1999; Scharpf, 2005). But such 
criticism cannot be upheld when considering that Bundesrat opinions, in fact, rarely diverge 
from the position of the federal government (Jeffery, 2007b, pp. 21-22; Moore & Eppler, 
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2008, p. 499), suggesting “that [article 23] has not been a significant problem for German EU 
policy-making” (Jeffery, 2007b, p. 22). Its basic provisions also survived Germany’s 2006 
federalism reform (Bauer, Knill & Ziegler, 2007, p. 742; Moore, Jacoby & Gunlicks, 2008, 
pp. 400-401). 
In addition to article 23, the Basic Law was also changed to allow for the creation of a 
Europe chamber in the Bundesrat “to fast-track decisions when time or confidentiality issues 
make full deliberation within the Bundesrat impractical” (Moore & Eppler, 2008, p. 493) but 
this meeting group has convened very rarely (Reuter, 2009, p. 24). 
Domestic changes furthermore concerned the states’ administrative structures. 
European policy sections were created in the individual departments (Jeffery, 1996b, p. 62). 
Additionally, in 1992, the states formed the Permanent Conference of the Länder Ministers 
for European Affairs (Europaministerkonferenz, EMK) which enables horizontal 
coordination between the states (Große Hüttmann & Knodt, 2000, p. 4; Jeffery, 1996b, p. 63; 
Knodt, 2002, p. 217). The EMK’s task is to coordinate Länder positions, to represent Länder 
interest towards the federal as well as the EU level and to streamline communication 
regarding the union (Schmuck, 2009, p. 490). Mainly concerned with fundamental EU topics, 
the conference meets a couple of times a year and leaves day-to-day EU business to the 
Bundesrat (p. 501). While there is sometimes a sense of competition between different 
ministerial conferences, the EMK is nevertheless a chance for the Länder to formulate 
common positions on those issues that cut across departments (p. 501). 
Apart from the EMK, German states began opening representations in Brussels in the 
mid-1980s (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998, p. 229; Hooghe & Marks, 2001, pp. 86-87; Rowe, 
2011, pp. 62-63). By that time, the Länder observer was not viewed as a sufficient 
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connection to the EU anymore (Rowe, 2011, pp. 61-62). These offices are further proof of 
the increased mobilization of the Länder in EU policy-making and will feature prominently 
in the latter part of this paper. 
On the European level, the Maastricht Treaty also sparked extensive changes for 
regional involvement. The treaty has been called the “high point” (Keating, 2008, p. 633) for 
regional influence because several provisions regarding regions in the EU were introduced 
(see, for example, Bauer & Börzel, 2010, pp. 257-258): 
1. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) was established. Today, it brings together 344 
politicians representing regional and local authorities from all over the EU 
(Committee of the Regions, 2012). This was part of the German states’ effort to 
establish a third level of regional governance. 
2. Regions gained entrance to the negotiations in the Council of Minister with article 
146 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) which is now article 
16 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010, p. 24). A more detailed look at 
both the Council and the CoR will be provided later. 
3. The principle of subsidiarity was formally inscribed into the treaty in what is now 
article 5 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010; Suszycka-Jasch & Jasch, 
2009, p. 1237; for an overview over EU institutions’ approach to subsidiarity, see van 
Hecke, 2003). The Länder had been pushing strongly for such an inclusion as early as 
1987 (Große Hüttmann & Knodt, 2000, p. 4; Münch et al., 2002; Suszycka-Jasch & 
Jasch, 2009, p. 1241). 
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Subnational mobilization II: …to focusing on autonomy 
After the Maastricht negotiations, regions in Europe and especially the German states seemed 
satisfied with what they had accomplished (Moore & Eppler, 2008, p. 494) so regions were 
rather quiet in the talks for the Amsterdam and Nice treaties in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. During this time, though, the Conference of European regions with legislative power 
(REGLEG) was founded in which all German states are represented and which pushes for 
clear allocation of competences between the European and the regional level (Hopkins, 2010, 
p. 65; Jeffery, 2005, p. 4; REGLEG, 2011). 
Also at the turn of the century, a European constitution was being debated. Länder 
were very active in voicing their opinion (Bauer, 2005, pp. 34-38; 2006, pp. 25-28). Yet, in 
the end, the constitutional discussion did not involve a serious reconsideration or 
strengthening of the regional level in the EU but mainly “some symbolic recognition of local 
and regional authorities” (Bauer & Börzel, 2010, p. 258; see also Jeffery, 2005, p. 5). For 
example, the CoR is still not an official EU institution on par with the Parliament or Council 
and its policy scope was not increased (Jeffery, 2005, p. 6). The treaty did include the 
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2010, pp. 206-209) which more clearly delineates when and 
how the subsidiarity principle should be used. By means of this protocol, the CoR as well as 
national parliaments gained the right to bring cases to the ECJ (p. 208). In addition, an early-
warning system for subsidiarity was established (p. 207) “to allow national parliaments to 
protest about EU legislation on subsidiarity grounds” (Jeffery, 2007a, p. 11). 
As can be seen from the succinct historical overview, German states have over time 
gained more and more rights to be included in European policy-making, especially in the 
domestic setting. On the EU level, the Länder are faced with a very heterogeneous and large 
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group of regions, which makes a strong and united regional level hard to achieve. The 
mobilization approach of establishing a pan-European third level of regional government has 
largely been abandoned, both in practice and in the literature (Keating, 2008, p. 633). 
Among scholars, it is, however, contested how exactly German states mobilize today. 
Charlie Jeffery argues “that where the Länder now talk about subsidiarity in the EU, they do 
so in an introspective way, focused on the exercise and protection of their internal 
competences” (Jeffery, 1996b, p. 70). They have discarded the third level tactic in favor of 
intra-state interest representation and consensus with the federal level (pp. 71-72). This is 
termed by the Länder as European domestic policy (Große Hüttmann & Knodt, 2000, p. 4; 
Jeffery, 1996b, p. 59; 2000, pp. 9-10). Jeffery and others later argued that the states opt for a 
maximum of autonomy and decision-making participation in the federal environment (Große 
Hüttmann & Knodt, 2000, pp. 9-10; Jeffery, 1998, p. 340; Knodt, 2002, pp. 220-221). Here, 
differences in entrepreneurship, regional distinctiveness as well as a Land’s legitimacy and 
social capital could lead to diverging influence on the European level (Jeffery, 2000, p. 18). 
Michael Bauer also acknowledges the end of the third level as a policy goal. But he 
hypothesizes that some Länder tend to focus more on autonomy and some more on 
participation (Bauer, 2006, p. 29). Agreeing on Jeffery’s regional identity factor, Bauer 
additionally points to the significance of party political cleavages and of actual affectedness 
(pp. 35-36). The latter describes the circumstance that for some Länder, it does not matter too 
much if they are autonomous or not because their “actual political room for manoeuvre” (p. 
35) is limited by scarce resources in the first place. 
 
 
  
 
3. Methodology, Sample and Data 
To answer my research questions, I complemented a thorough literature review with 
qualitative interviews. The format of semi-structured in-depth interviews was chosen as a 
means to engage in still fairly explorative research. This type of interview makes two-way 
communication with the interviewee possible which in turn “allows the researcher to respond 
to the situation at hand, to the emerging worldview of the respondent, and to new ideas on 
the topic.” (Merriam, 2009, p. 90) On the downside, there are some dangers with this 
qualitative data gathering, from potential interviewer bias (Holloway, 1997, p. 96) to the 
possibility for respondents to provide untrue information (Keegan, 2009, pp. 82-84) in order 
to portray themselves or their regional office in a certain light (Tatham, 2008, p. 495). 
But as I deem the value of first-hand expert evaluations on states’ representation 
higher than these methodological disadvantages, I still set out to find interview partners. To 
be included in my sample, three conditions had to be met: Firstly, the respondent needed to 
be employed by the Land so that familiarity with Land-specific issues and work methods was 
given and the regional outlook (instead of the national or supranational) was maintained. 
Secondly, the respondent needed to work in the broad field of EU affairs for his or her Land. 
Thirdly, the respondent needed to know all six channels of interest representation and, 
preferably, deal with at least one of them on a regular basis. 
Based on these criteria, I sought out interview partners in the states’ administrations: 
One group of respondents was working in the Länder representations in Berlin or in the state 
chancelleries in the respective state capitals. The other group was made up of officials from 
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the Länder bureaus in Brussels. The Brussels offices by themselves have been identified as 
valuables proxies for regional EU interest representation (Tatham, 2010a, pp. 81-82; 
forthcoming, 2013b, p. 6). In my study, I can additionally compare and cross-check the 
Brussels perspective with the one from the region itself. 
In total, I conducted 30 interviews (see table 1). The interviews lasted approximately 
between 20 and 80 minutes, with the respondents speaking on the condition of anonymity 
(when referring to the interviewees, I will use the male pronoun throughout, even though the 
sample included both women and men; all German to English translations in this paper were 
done by the author). All officials were asked a set of roughly thirteen questions about the 
structure of their office, their general view on the importance of EU representation, their 
evaluation of each of the different representation channels and their evaluation of those 
channels if there are diverging interests with the member state (see appendix). The answers 
were coded and aggregated so as to analyze similarities and difference among the Länder. 
While the semi-structured nature of the interview allowed for follow-up questions and further 
comments, the data is still comparable because the same questions were asked every time and 
because the open-ended questions were formulated so that comparability was guaranteed. 
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Table 1. Sample 
Land 
official in Brussels official in Germany 
Code Date Personal Recorded Code Date Personal Recorded 
Baden-
Württemberg 
A1 Dec 
2011 
yes no B1 Nov  
2011 
yes yes 
Bavaria A2 Dec 
2011 
yes yes B2 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
Berlin A3 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B3 Jan 
2012 
yes yes 
Brandenburg A4 Dec 
2011 
phone yes B4 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
Bremen A5 Dec 
2011 
yes yes B5 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
Hesse A6 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B6 Dec 
2011 
yes yes 
Lower 
Saxony 
A7 Dec 
2011 
yes yes B7 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
Mecklenburg-
Western 
Pomerania 
A8 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B8 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
A9 Dec 
2011 
yes yes B9 Dec 
2011 
phone yes 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
A10 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B10 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
Saarland A11 Dec 
2011 
phone yes B11 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
Saxony A12 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B12 Dec 
2011 
yes yes 
Saxony-
Anhalt 
A13 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B13 Dec 
2011 
yes yes 
Thuringia A14 Nov 
2011 
yes yes B14 Dec 
2011 
yes yes 
Hamburg n/a n/a n/a n/a B15 Nov 
2011 
phone yes 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
n/a n/a n/a n/a B16 Nov 
2011 
yes yes 
 14 out of 16 Länder (= 87.5%) 16 out of 16 Länder (100%) 
 
There are certain limitations to this sample. Most importantly, the sample is not 
representative for two reasons: Externally, not all Brussels offices are part of the sample. 
Internally, there is only a maximum of two interviewed officials per Land. Their statements 
should therefore not be generalized or exaggerated but merely taken as a hint on how Länder 
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representation might work. Also, the sample is only made up of subnational regional 
representatives. Their accounts are not cross-checked with other actors such as national and 
supranational officials. 
The overlap of the Brussels and German officials, while allowing for a certain 
control, is another caveat: It might be redundant or even contradictory to include both sites in 
the sample. But it has to be remembered that both places use direct channels to the union and 
both are genuinely regional actors – in contrast to CoR members or Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) who are influenced by party politics and are part of the EU 
institutions. Furthermore, this overlap is in and of itself a distinct feature of German EU 
policy-making (see figure 2 on page 25). 
The independent variables size, resources, an East-West divide and conflicts of 
interest with the federal level were chosen based on existing literature and Germany’s 
structural and institutional situation. Size and resources are relatively easy to measure and 
have been addressed in previous studies (see, for example, Tatham, 2010a, pp. 79-80). The 
look at a possible East-West divide is justified considering Germany’s recent history and the 
continued asymmetries between the two regions (Benz, 1999, pp. 69-72). Finally, the 
question if channel preferences change when there is a conflict of interest with the national 
government is interesting in light of Germany’s pronounced federal structure and the issue of 
bypassing interest representation (Keating & Hooghe, 2006; Marks, Nielsen, Ray & Salk, 
1996; Tatham, 2010a, 2010b, forthcoming, 2013a). 
 The qualitative results on the independent variables from the interviews are 
complemented with data from official German and EU publications. For a German state’s 
size and population, the 2009 data emanates from the federal as well as regional statistical 
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offices (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2011a). Regarding resource richness, 
for which I looked at the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2011b) as well as the debt 
per capita (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011b, pp. 78-79), the same sources with data from 
2010 were consulted. The union’s contribution to the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), which is co-financed by the member states and the EU, were taken from the 
Commission’s website (European Commission, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g, 
2007h, 2007i, 2007j, 2007k, 2007l, 2007m, 2007n, 2007o, 2007p, 2007q, 2007r). As a proxy 
for conflicting interest representation, I also noted in my data the ruling or acting regional 
coalition in power in mid-March 2012 to see whether it was different from the federal 
coalition. These statistics, along with the number of members in the CoR (Committee of the 
Regions, 2011) and the EP (Informationsbüro des Europäischen Parlaments für Deutschland, 
2011) as well as the number of votes in the Bundesrat (Reuter, 2009, p. 1), are summarized in 
table 2. 
Some of the methodological shortcomings mentioned in this section open up avenues 
for further research. For example, broadening the sample to national and/or supranational 
officials would help validate or disprove the regional representatives’ evaluations. A focus on 
one particular policy area or a particular set of Länder also seems feasible. 
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Table 2. Economic and political indicators regarding German states 
 
 
  
 
4. Findings 
4.1 German States’ Interest Representation towards the EU 
4.1.1 Motives 
All of the interviewed officials attributed high importance to regional interest representation 
in EU affairs. A lack of variance does not come as a surprise here because all respondents 
work in EU affairs, so with any other answer they would have dismissed their own 
significance. Therefore, it is more helpful to examine what reasons they gave for why EU 
representation is important for the Länder. Four major explanations were identified. 
 
Structural funds 
To begin with, the topic that has historically led to a closer look at regions in the EU is still 
valid today: Several interviewees specified structural funds as a main reason for why EU 
interest representation is crucial for them (B3, B4, B8, B10, B12, A14, B14). In the 
interviews, structural funds were most often and most explicitly addressed by the Eastern 
German states. Respondents working in Eastern German representations all mentioned the 
financial repercussions of the EU at some point while this issue was only rarely addressed by 
other Länder (A5, B10). Moreover, officials for East German Länder working in Germany 
tended to bring up the topic more often than the respondents in Brussels. So, either the 
officials in Belgium take the chase after structural funds for granted or they do not view it as 
such a high priority as their colleagues at home. The latter option seems to be the reality, 
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deducting from the talks in Brussels. As an example, one interviewee stressed the importance 
of telling the home administration that setting one’s policy priorities is much more efficient 
than demanding more money (A4, also A5). 
 The reason why East German Länder are especially focused on the structural funds is 
found in the allocation of the funds. Except for Berlin, all East German Länder are covered 
under the convergence objective of the ERDF (see figure 1) which is the objective with the 
highest possible funding for the poorest regions (European Commission, 2012a, 2012b). 
Therefore, under the 2007 to 2013 ERDF, the Eastern German Länder generally receive more 
EU funds per capita than the other states (see also table 2 on page 19). 
 
Figure 1. Convergence and competitiveness objectives, 2007-2013 (European 
Commission, 2007a, p. 1) 
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European legislation 
The Länder are in charge of implementing federal laws and because more and more of these 
are concocted in Brussels, the regional level is indirectly affected by the Europeanization of 
law. Interviewees pointed this out repeatedly (B1, B2, A3, B4, A6, B6, A11, B12, B14), yet 
with varying statistics: One said 30 to 40 percent of laws are influenced by the EU (B12), 
another said 50 percent (B2) and still others went as high as 70 or 80 percent (A6, B6). 
Around a quarter to half of the Bundesrat’s agenda comes directly from Brussels (B11, B14). 
Since all Länder share the same institutional function, there was no variance in their general 
assessment of the legislative impact of the EU. 
 
Specific policy interests 
German states do not, however, share the same focus on respective policy fields. So, thirdly, 
some Länder have a particular focus on the EU because policy fields that are of high salience 
to them are dominated by EU legislation. One example that was given by almost a quarter of 
the respondents was agriculture. If a Land has a strong agricultural sector, it might view EU 
interest representation as even more important than usual because most of Europe’s 
agricultural policy is decided in Brussels (B1, A2, A4, A6, B8, B13, A14). Generally, if 
those policy fields that concern a state the most are heavily influenced by EU legislation, 
including agriculture but also environment, transportation or research, then there is a greater 
need for EU interest representation. This is in contrast to, for example, social policy, where 
the federal level is responsible for the laws with little input from the EU (B13). Here, 
lobbying the federal government rather than the EU institutions would be the states’ first 
choice. 
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 For a third of the officials, interest representation is mostly a reaction to Commission 
proposals or Green and White Books (B2, B3, A5, B5, A6, B8, B10, A12, B14, B16). This 
would entail monitoring Commission activity, developing positions on topics relevant to the 
respective Land and then engaging with different actors. But 70 percent of the respondents 
acknowledged that interest representation can be both reactionary and proactive (A1, B1, A2, 
A3, A4, B4, B15, B6, A7, B7, A8, B8, A9, B9, A10, A11, B11, B12, A13, B13, A14). 
A proactive stance is taken in precisely those policy fields and industries that are 
important to a state (B1, A2, B2, B5, B6, B7, B8, A13, B13, A14). For example, primary law 
and EU enlargement are topics that Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg actively publish their 
positions on (B1, B2). Bavaria also focuses strongly on agriculture and education (A2). 
Hesse is particularly concerned about transportation and mobility (A6, B6). As mentioned 
before, many poorer German states prioritize structural funds. 
What this shows is a divergence in the areas that Länder represent their EU interests 
in. While not a surprising finding, it is crucial to stress this policy-driven approach to interest 
representation. It means that structural differences between the Länder also account for 
different behavior on the EU level. Stressing the salience of policy issues is in line with 
previous work on EU interest representation that often implicitly takes salience as a key 
explanatory factor (Tatham, forthcoming, 2013b, pp. 3-4). 
 
Support for European integration 
A fourth motive for EU interest representation is inspired by one respondent calling himself 
and his colleagues “glowing Europeans” (A9). While others might not choose words as 
solemn as these, it must be considered that some of the respondents view EU interest 
representation as important because they view the EU and European integration as important. 
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There is, in fact, a constitutionally mandated duty for Germany to foster European integration 
(article 23; Deutscher Bundestag, 2010, p. 28). But in a less tangible way, officials working 
in Brussels might normatively view European integration as favorable, either out of personal 
conviction or because of socialization effects in the European setting. 
  
4.1.2 The Brussels Office 
As described above, the MLG concept envisions multiple actors negotiating with each other. 
Regional actors as one level of government thus have the chance to engage not only with 
domestic actors but also with a range of supranational actors directly, using different 
channels. The concept of channels allowing access to Europe has been lingering in the 
literature since the mid-1990s (Hooghe, 1995). Usually, these channels include the Council 
of the European Union (Council of Ministers), the European Commission, the European 
Parliament (EP), the CoR, associations as well as the Brussels office (Hooghe & Marks, 
2001; Rowe, 2011, pp. 51-53; Tatham, 2008, p. 498). However, both from a theoretical as 
well as from a practical point of view I do not presuppose that Brussels offices can be 
regarded in the same category as the other channels (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2. German states’ EU interest representation (adapted from Rowe, 2011, p. 5; 
Tatham, 2008, p. 498) 
 
 
As figure 1 illustrates, there is a double overlap for Brussels offices. One overlap is 
organizational, because they form part of the Land administration but are located in Brussels. 
Another overlap concerns their classification as a channel: The offices are a Brussels channel 
for the state capital but mainly because they are a gateway to the five other actual EU-level 
channels, thus becoming both a domestic and a supranational channel. Due to this overlap, it 
is appropriate not to place them in the same category as the other five channels (for more 
studies on German and other regional offices, see Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Kettunen & 
Kull, 2009; Marks, Haesly & Mbaye, 2002; Mbaye, 2009; Moore, 2006, 2008; Nielsen & 
Salk, 1998; Rowe, 2011; Tatham, 2010a). 
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Resources 
To measure the resources the Länder have at their disposal for EU interest representation, the 
number of employees in the Brussels office is used as a proxy value. This approach has 
several serious impediments in general (Tatham, 2010a, pp. 81-82) but also some specific to 
the German case. For one, the number of employees in Brussels has to be evaluated in 
connection to the number of people working on EU affairs in the Länder administrations in 
Germany. This would include the EU minister and his staff, people in the Berlin 
representations and officials for the EU affairs section of each specific department, such as 
agriculture, education or transportation. A good backing from home can greatly enhance the 
effect of the Brussels office and vice versa (A14). The connection to the home base cannot be 
quantified, however: The total number of people working on EU affairs in Berlin and the 
state capitals is not fixed because any official might have to deal with EU matters at any 
time. Moreover, as will be seen, personal networks play an enormous role in the Brussels 
representations. Therefore, even a small team of officials could have a big impact if their 
commitment and their networks are vast. 
With these caveats in mind and for lack of a better quantitative indicator, the number 
of employees in Brussels will be used as an approximation. This statistic will be 
complemented with qualitative evidence in the remaining parts of the paper. 
 A total of 242 German officials were working in the German representations at the 
time of the survey, an average of 15.13 employees per office. In addition to the head of the 
office, there are usually some full-time and part-time officials as well as interns (A2, A13). 
Some offices have a rotation principle that brings officials from the state capital to Brussels 
and vice versa for a certain amount of time (A3, A13). 
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 There are substantial differences in the number of employees in the Brussels office 
(see figure 3). All respondents were in agreement that the size of the staff was adequate, even 
though 16.7 percent of the interviewees said this was barely the case (A1, A2, A5, A11, 
A12). In comparison to their European colleagues, all German offices in Brussels are well-
equipped: Previous studies found averages of 5.37 (Tatham, forthcoming, 2013a, p. 30) and 
6.3 (Blatter, Kreutzer, Rentl & Thiele, 2008, p. 486) employees, respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Number of employees in the Brussels offices 
*These numbers were taken from the Hanse Office website and confirmed in an email by one 
of the officials. There are a total of 15 people working in the Hanse Office, sharing 
responsibilities for both represented Länder. All other numbers are taken from the interviews. 
 
 As a next step from this descriptive finding, it is again useful to look for explanatory 
factors. The office size does not seem to depend on whether there is an oppositional regional 
government in place or not. For instance, both the biggest and the smallest office represent 
CDU-led Länder. Interviewees did not systematically point to party politics affecting office 
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size but to validate this, a long-term study of party political staffing decisions would be 
necessary for which I have not gathered data. 
Population size may be a fairly decent indicator, as the five most populous Länder 
also have the five biggest offices (see figure 4) and smaller Länder tend to have fewer 
employees. But there are also several exceptions such as rather small Länder having mid-
sized offices, for instance Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate or even Thuringia. 
 
Figure 4. Brussels employees and population 
 
 
Similar to population size, GDP per capita can be taken as a hint of an explanation 
(see figure 5). Outliers seem to be the fairly rich states Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg and 
Saarland which have fewer than a dozen people working in Brussels. Here, it is interesting to 
note that these four states have the highest debt per capita among German states, so their 
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GDP per capita wealth is relativized. Therefore, it could still be that the richer a state is, the 
bigger its office is. 
 
Figure 5. Brussels employees and GDP per capita in € 
 
 
A look at the structural funds partly supports this view (see figure 6): Those Länder 
that get the most funds have small to mid-sized staffs but certainly do not have the biggest 
offices. At the same time, those very Länder that receive the least ERDF money, have the 
biggest offices, with Hamburg as an exception. It might be that regions collecting the largest 
shares of the ERDF simply cannot afford a bigger office, which would be logical considering 
the largest shares of the ERDF should be collected by the poorest regions. A different causal 
relation along the motto of “We get our money anyways, we do not need a big 
representation.” did not emanate from the interviews, as the officials from the Eastern 
German Länder stressed the importance of securing funds. 
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If the correlation of relative poverty and office size is accepted, this would also 
explain why, on average, Eastern German offices have 10.84 employees and Western 
German offices have 17.7 (see figure 7). In the end, resources – and not need – determine the 
size of the office in Brussels, highlighting the expensive nature of subnational mobilization 
which might favor resource-rich regions. 
 
Figure 6. Brussels employees and ERDF per capita in € 
 
 
Figure 7. Brussels employees in Eastern and Western German states 
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Activities 
Various functions and activities of regional offices have been identified (Marks et al., 2002, 
pp. 4-6; Rowe, 2011, pp. 83-84) but based on the interviews, I have found only two broad 
categories of activities: the task of promotion as well as the intertwined activities of 
information exchange and networking. No respondent named promotional or representative 
functions as the most important task of his office. While it is certainly part of an office’s job 
description, in this paper, I would like to focus on information exchange and networking. 
In order to exchange information, one needs networks, and in order to get networks, 
one needs information. So, in line with previous research (Marks et al., 2002, p. 7; Rowe, 
2011, p. 84) and the interviews, I grouped together the tasks of information exchange and 
networking. Figure 8 shows the simplified chain of events of how German states represent 
their interests towards the EU via their office: The office collects information from the EU 
level and delivers it to the state capital. There, a Land position is formed which the office 
then carries back to the EU institutions. 
 
Figure 8. Brussels offices’ connection with the EU and the state capital 
 
  
Thus, bureaus not only send information home to the state capital like in the early 
days of the office. They are “a service which selects, interprets, filters and analyses the 
information gathered” (Moore, 2006, p. 198). One respondent termed this “translation work: 
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Helping understand why some [actors] stick to their positions and others don’t.” (A7) 
Another analogy used was that of being an “antenna and service provider” (A8) in the sense 
that an antenna can both send out and receive data. 
In order to become this intelligence service provider (Moore, 2006, p. 198; Rowe, 
2011, p. 83), all Brussels respondents stressed the importance of close, personal and direct 
contacts in the EU institutions. Most of these are found on the working level of the 
Commission. The Land officials in Brussels are tasked with acquiring and cultivating 
contacts in the Commission according to their policy field. One Brussels interviewee 
described the qualifications needed for officials (A9): “My colleagues here in the office, their 
core competence apart from their technical work is to network with others, to build good 
personal contacts to the cabinet of a Commissioner, to communicate with important 
parliamentarians or with other stakeholders.” By doing this, the officials receive early 
intelligence on proposals and they have an entry point when they want to present information 
and policy positions from their home region. 
The advantage of maintaining a Brussels office is its proximity and easy access to the 
EU-level actors (A2, A7, A10, A12), both in a geographical and a social context. 
Entrepreneurship – “[t]he personal authority, interests and commitment invested by those 
responsible for leading EU policy” (Jeffery, 2000, p. 15) – is therefore decisive. But 
entrepreneurship and personal engagement are difficult to measure quantitatively and are not 
highly associated with the number of employees: A vast and deep network by three regional 
officials might be worth much more than 30 regional officials’ small and shallow personal 
connections. Apart from networking with institutional and non-institutional EU actors, office 
employees and heads of offices also meet each other regularly in thematic study groups, 
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facilitating horizontal coordination among the Länder (A12; Rowe, 2011, p. 104). The 
propensity of German states to cooperate in Brussels has been established before (Salk, 
Nielsen & Marks, 2001, p. 12). 
There is generally a need for coordination and cooperation. While this entails 
compromises and may take a long time (B7, A12), 60 percent of the respondents regarded 
partnerships as indispensable (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B5, B15, A6, B6, A7, A8, B8, B10, A11, 
B11, A12, A13, B16). The following statement summarizes their reasoning: “Voicing a 
single interest is less successful than coming together in a network.” (A11) The importance 
of partnerships with other Länder, with other regions, with the federal level or with 
associations were mentioned by roughly 60 percent of the interviewees, regardless of size, 
resources or diverging regional-federal interests. Only three interviewees – from 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate – 
explicitly said their Land might attempt to push for its position without anyone else backing 
it. While these states are all opposition-led, this cannot be taken as an explanation. Rather, 
the respondents emphasized that solo representation happens only in the very rare instances 
when extremely Land-specific original interests are concerned (B8, A9, A10, B10). This 
supports the analysis that policy fields and salience matter and might be true for other states 
as well, even though the interviewees did not talk about it. For example, there was consensus 
that “[a]lliances are topical, they are not static” (A5) which means that some policy fields 
lend themselves to forming partnerships and others do not. 
A certain East-West divide can be detected, as the Eastern German Länder underlined 
their cooperation (B3, A8, A12, A13, B13). Yet, even this appears to be rather policy-driven: 
Among Eastern German states, there is a shared focus on structural funds and a certain type 
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of agriculture – just like there are structural similarities between Bavaria and neighboring 
German and non-German regions or between Berlin and other capital cities which make 
wide-ranging cooperation possible (A2, A3, also B1, B6, B11). 
Brussels interviewees from the four biggest offices and Berlin explicitly stated that 
they do not view themselves as lobbyists comparable to special interest groups because they 
are electorally backed and work for the public good and not special interests (A1, A2, A3, 
A6, A9). Nevertheless, they acknowledged their lobbying position and the offices’ 
description as a lobbyist was shared by several Germany-based respondents (A1, A2, A3, B4, 
B5, A6, B7, A9, B10, B12, B14; for a similar analysis, see Rowe, 2011, pp. 94-95). With a 
look to the independent variables, neither the East/West consideration nor size nor diverging 
regional-federal interests can be used as explanations for why some offices consider 
themselves lobbyists and some do not mention this. A slight hint might again be given by the 
ERDF and GDP per capita: Apart from Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia, it was mostly 
states that receive only little or mid-sized funds and have rather high GDP rates that would 
call themselves lobbyists. 
 
4.1.3 Channels for Interest Representation 
Council of Ministers 
It was mostly the officials working in Germany that credited importance to interest 
representation towards the Council. While the Brussels officials acknowledged its power, 
nobody named it as their primary contact. “We don’t need to lobby [the Council] here”, said 
a Brussels respondent (A7), “because we’re part of it through our Bundesrat deputies (…).” 
This shows very clearly that the Council is an EU channel worked predominantly through the 
federal government. With article 23 and the Bundesrat procedure, German states can 
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influence the federal position, which was regarded as an important entry way to the Council 
(see also Bomberg & Peterson, 1998, p. 222). Moreover, there is also the latent threat of one 
or more Länder suing the federal government based on a violation of article 23 (B2, B12). 
Yet, there is more direct Länder participation as well. The Länder may ask for 
inclusion in areas that are domestically in their exclusive competence (Bundesrat, 2010a, p. 
187). This only happens rarely (B5, B15) and the conduct of negotiations is left to the federal 
government in any case. The inclusion of a Bundesrat-appointed Länder representative is 
obligatory for the policy fields education, culture and broadcasting and here, he has the right 
to conduct the negotiations (Bundesrat, 2010b, pp. 187-188). This has to be done in 
accordance with the federal representative, though. The Länder have gradually learned how 
to conduct negotiations, after being “overstrained” (B13) by this task in the beginning. 
Nevertheless, the Council negotiations are still the “playing field for the member states” 
(A13, also A8) in that compromised positions are usually made beforehand under the strong 
leadership of the federal government. Sometimes there are struggles over who gets to 
represent Germany in the Council but these disputes are more about representation than 
about content (A2, B2). 
 Many Länder also have representatives in the lower-level Council working groups 
(A2, B2, A5, A6, A7, B8, A10, B11, A12, A13; Thuringia has none; no answers for the 
others). The Länder observer also has access and with his timely and detailed reports from 
every session, he remains an important source of information for the Länder (B7). Even 
without access, officials from the Council “are at liberty to talk about the topic over lunch or 
on other occasions” (A2) with regional employees. This would support the analysis of the 
Council as a place for socializing (Tatham, 2008, p. 501). 
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 The role of the representative in the working groups is that of an observer rather than 
an influencing force (A1, A2, A3, A5, B5, A6, A7, A9, A10, B8, B12). He is selected by the 
Bundesrat (B11) and instructed from the home region, not the Brussels office (A14) which is 
another reason for why the regional representations do not have much to do with the Council.  
As an information gatherer, his role is essential. The goal is to present the regional position 
as far as possible and otherwise focus on gaining information on the federal position and 
sometimes even other member states’ positions (B13). 
Another way to deal with the Council is through the Permanent Representation. For 
example, the thematic study groups might include experts from the Permanent 
Representations (A3). The bureaus are also informally in touch with the federal officials and 
have access to the Permanent Representation’s databases (A3, A13). 
 
European Commission 
The Council is a key source of information once positions are consolidated. The 
Commission, though, is the access point that regions can use for the earliest possible 
information on legislative proposals. This is absolutely crucial because the Länder have to 
implement EU legislation developed largely in the Commission (B3, B15, B6, A8, B8, B13, 
A13, A14). For this reason, the Commission was regarded by all Brussels respondents as 
their primary and by far most important contact. No divergences in how the regions represent 
their interests towards the Commission could be detected. 
 For one, the German states together can forward their opinions on proposals directly 
to the Commission. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission sends all types of initiatives 
directly to the national parliaments and allows them to comment (protocol 1 formalized a 
closer parliaments-Commission relationship fostered by the Barroso initiative since 2006; 
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Official Journal of the European Union, 2010, pp. 203-205). This way, the Bundesrat can 
forward the opinions on EU initiatives not only to the federal government but also to the 
Commission (B2, B5, B10, B11, B12). The Länder do this in “selected cases” (B10) via the 
Bundesrat in Berlin and then usually hear back from the Commission relatively promptly. 
The more important relationship with the Commission is established in Brussels, though. 
 First, as mentioned earlier, Brussels officials try to find contacts and personal 
networks within the Commission. Institutionalized routes to the Commission do not exist so 
regional officials have to work to meet Commission officials, their deputies, assistants or 
friends informally (A1, A2, A3, B3, A4, A5, A6, B7, A8, A10, A11, B12, A13, B16; see also  
Rowe, 2011, pp. 92-93). For example, the bureaus might invite Commission officials to their 
regular study groups (A12, A13). But meetings are also possible through the Permanent 
Representation, at official events or over lunch or dinner in the Belgian capital. While a 
greater number of employees is certainly beneficial, again, the more significant consideration 
is the nature and depth of contacts: What counts is who the officials know in the Commission 
and how well they can access them. This quality cannot be related to my independent 
variables and as it pertains to individual commitment and personality, it is hard to measure. 
 Ideally, regional employees would first try to find Commission officials who are 
German or know Germany and its language. Sometimes this can be tough (A2, A14), 
especially for particular German regulatory matters such as public savings banks 
(Sparkassen). Therefore, link-ups usually occur according to policy fields. One respondent 
stated that “[e]veryone here [in the Brussels office] should know those people that are 
important for their field of work [in the Commission]” (A7). This sentiment can be taken as a 
guideline for all offices. 
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 Once the personal connections have been knit, it is the foremost task of the office to 
access the Commission as early as possible (B1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B15, A6, B6, A7, B7, A9, 
B9, A10, A11, A12, B13; see also Rowe, 2011, pp. 92-93; Tatham, 2008, p. 503). One 
interviewee said (B6): 
The ideal point to voice your interests is the moment when in the Commission 
someone starts thinking about thinking about writing something down. That’s where 
you need to be present. That surely is the big leagues, that doesn’t always work. But 
it’s much easier to stop a certain phrasing from entering a text in the first place than to 
cross it out later through revision procedures in the legislative process via the 
European Parliament. 
When a proposal is being published and especially when the Council and the EP deal with it, 
it is often too late for the regions to have meaningful influence over the drafts. So, constant 
communication with Commission officials is the bureau’s main form of lobbying: After 
informing them of their regional view point, the regions can hope to be taken into 
consideration. The Commission, generally very open to and thankful for input from any 
external actor, actively seeks regional expertise (A1, A2, A3, A4, A6, B6, A9, A12, A14; see 
also Bomberg & Peterson, 1998, p. 223; Tatham, 2008, p. 502). The two following 
statements relate to this: 
[T]he officials are also thankful. They are sitting far off from anything (…) in their 
ivory tower and don’t know what’s going on on the ground and when somebody 
comes along then who’s closer to what’s going on, then they’re thankful for the 
information. (B7) 
 
[The Commission officials] don’t just sit at their desks and say, ‘Let’s make a nice 
directive now.’ but they ask, ‘Where are problems that we have to regulate and what 
facts do we need for that and who are the people concerned?’ (A9) 
 Apart from personal contacts, five Brussels offices reported that they monitor and 
analyze the Commission’s roadmap for the upcoming year early on (A2, A6, A9, A12, B13). 
For example, North Rhine-Westphalia’s annual “European political priorities” identify what 
regulations pertain to the Land and why, what the Land’s goal are and what department is 
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responsible (A9; Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2010). The positions are decided in the respective 
state capitals afterwards. Such a division of labor has the Brussels offices focusing on the 
working level preparations through contacts and intelligence services, while the political 
decisions are made in the administration (A4, A11; see also figure 8 on page 31). 
A further indication for this division of labor is the fact that the bureau officials seek 
out contacts on the working level of the Commission but may prepare political meetings 
between members of the regional government and higher ranking Commission officials. A 
little over half of the respondents – again regardless of size, resources or conflicting regional-
federal interests – specifically addressed their governments’ ability to get in touch with the 
heads of the Directorate-Generals or the Commissioners (B1, A2, B2, A4, B4, A5, B5, B15, 
A6, B7, A8, B8, A9, A11, A12, B12). Some variance according to size was given: “It is 
already hard for the regional level to get access to all Commissioners”, said one respondent 
(A8), “And here, it is tougher yet for a smaller region than, say, for the prime minister of the 
Free State of Bavaria.” (A8) Nevertheless, smaller states such as Brandenburg do have access 
to the Commission as well, as Commissioners’ visits to the state exemplify (A4). 
 
European Parliament 
The Brussels respondents all agreed that after the Commission, the EP is the second-most 
important arena for German states’ interest representation (see also Rowe, 2011, pp. 93-94). 
As previous research has shown, MEPs can be powerful actors because they are relatively 
free and unbound by party politics compared to the domestic setting, because they have great 
access to the Commission and because their credentials as directly elected politicians give 
them a considerable amount of soft power (Tatham, 2008, pp. 505-506). Over time and 
especially since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP’s power has only increased. Hence, the regions are 
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well advised to engage with the parliamentarians as they would with the Commission 
officials. This is mostly done in Brussels by the Länder bureaus. 
 60 percent of the respondents said that the Brussels offices’ first points of reference in 
the EP are those delegates from their own region (A2, B2, A3, A4, B4, A5, B15, B6, A7, A8, 
A10, B10, A11, A12, B12, A13, B13, B16). More specifically, Länder officials get in touch 
with an MEP’s office or his assistant (A5, A10, A12). One respondent described the 
reasoning behind contacting MEPs from the home region first (A13): 
Cooperation is always easiest if parliamentarians stem from the region. The farther 
they are away from the region, the more important the content is to find affection and 
support from the parliamentarians. If the MEP has his constituency in the Land, then 
he is by that alone structurally interested to cooperate closely with the Länder offices. 
It helps that in the EP, regional and national affiliations might sometimes be more important 
than party affiliations (A2, B6, A10, B12; see also Costello & Thomson, 2010, p. 236). 
Accordingly, Länder officials recognize that an MEP is a political delegate but they also 
“don’t think that Land interests are completely absent from his mind” (B16). While again 
there is no variance in how the Länder view the EP as a channel, a clear divergence occurs in 
usage along more and less populous states: Bigger states have more MEPs and thus have 
better chances of finding a parliamentarian with knowledge about and sympathy for regional 
problems. Conversely, the low number of MEPs from the home region was mentioned as a 
difficulty by some interviewees from smaller states (B4, A5, A8, B8, A12, A14). 
A second line of access is available, though, as the long quote above indicates. If the 
regional approach does not offer itself, the Länder officials seek out those parliamentarians 
that are experts in the particular policy field at hand (A4, A5, B6, A7, A9, A11, A12; see also 
Tatham, 2008, pp. 504-505). Here, the preference is to get in touch with committee heads, 
rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs. Access to these important positions is harder if no 
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regional connection is given. Rewards are potentially high, though, because the officials 
know that these MEPs have considerable influence over EP legislative drafts and opinions  
and that they offer a good possibility of voicing regional interests (A6; see also Costello & 
Thomson, 2010, pp. 235-236). Moreover, similar to Commission officials, rapporteurs 
actively seek external expertise for their opinions (A14). 
Yet, accessing the EP usually occurs after a Commission proposal is already on the 
table (A2, A4, A5). If interest representation at the Commission has not fully worked to a 
state’s satisfaction or has come too late, there is then the chance to influence rapporteurs and 
other MEPs. This is a hard task (B8) because while regional considerations are given, MEPs 
act and vote according to their convictions in the end (A5). It is thus especially noteworthy 
that the EP is still considered the second-most important channel by all Brussels 
interviewees. Because Germany-based respondents agreed on the EP’s importance, it can be 
deducted that the Parliament is today viewed as a viable force in the EU’s decision-making 
process by the Länder. Some officials in Germany did hint at the chance of party political 
contacts to MEPs (B1, B7, B10, B14), despite the dominance of regional affiliation. 
The EP is – just like the Council and Commission – also a source of information for 
the Länder. Via their office, they collect first-hand intelligence from parliamentary 
committees, which is useful for formulating Länder positions. Furthermore, the EP 
cooperates with the Bundesrat and Bundestag, for example through exchanges and meetings 
(B13). 
 
Committee of the Regions 
The CoR fulfills three functions (Carroll, 2011, p. 342; for an introduction to the CoR, see 
Dinan, 2010, pp. 285-288; Domorenok, 2009): representative, advisory and symbolic 
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functions. Its members are regional and local representatives who can be held politically 
accountable, it is a consultative body writing opinions for the Commission and it is a symbol 
for subsidiarity (Carroll, 2011, pp. 343-350). The CoR’s strength has been called into 
question due to its diverse and large membership, its lack of decision-making power and 
cleavages within the Committee (Christiansen, 1996, pp. 111-115; Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 
p. 82; Hopkins, 2010, pp. 60-61; Jeffery, 2007a, pp. 4-5; John, 2000, p. 889; Loughlin, 1996, 
pp. 155-156; Moore, 2009, pp. 2-3; Tatham, 2008, p. 506). As a result of these weaknesses, 
the CoR has not developed powerful legislative influence but it has consolidated its 
representative and symbolic functions. 
The respondents all acknowledged the CoR’s shortcomings, with some still stressing 
that, formally, it is their only way of providing regional input (B8, B9, A12, A13, B13). The 
Länder were instrumental in bringing about this body but the enthusiasm they had at its 
inception in the mid-1990s has waned (Jeffery, 1995, p. 254; 1996b, p. 70). Nevertheless, 
there are ways in which the German states utilize the CoR. Both officials at home and in 
Brussels are involved because the politicians sitting in the Committee establish their 
positions at home but meetings are prepared in Brussels (A5, B5, A14). Nevertheless, the 
federal government submits the list of proposed Committee members to the Council 
(European Communities, 2009, pp. 25-26), a sign that the CoR is not completely regional. 
 The Committee fulfills its representative and symbolic functions. The CoR brings 
together different municipalities and regions from all over Europe. It is thus a forum where 
Länder can exchange information, see what regions have similar problems, build 
relationships and develop their positions accordingly (A1, A2, B2, A5, B15, A6, A7, A8, 
A10, B10, B11, B13, A14). In line with previous findings (Tatham, 2008, pp. 506, 511), one 
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interviewee described how the CoR helps the Commission and the regions gauge potential 
policy positions (A13): 
The CoR is virtually a test balloon for where European compromises lie because the 
interests of local and regional authorities in Europe do, of course, oftentimes overlap 
with those of the national level so that if you put forth issues early on in the CoR and 
then have serious debates, then the results are not far off from what actually gets 
done. 
Nevertheless, the CoR’s advisory role was largely dismissed. Only 20 percent of the 
interviewees explicitly mentioned the importance of CoR opinions, pointing out that the 
Commission and Parliament exhibit a growing interest in them (B4, A5, A6, A8, A11, B13; 
also Neshkova, 2010). Formulating opinions and making decisions usually takes too long in 
the CoR so it is only useful if addressed very early (A3, B12, A13, B13). One respondent 
said: “The time and effort [put in] are enormous and in some way contrary to the political 
effect.” (A5) 
Apart from its strength as a forum, there is little importance to the CoR as a channel 
for interest representation for German states. However, three respondents from relatively 
small states (A8, A10, A13) said that the effect of the CoR depends on how much effort the 
individual Land puts in. All Länder have members there and will not deny the formal 
significance of the body. But from the interviews, it became clear, for example, that Berlin 
does not focus on the CoR work too much (A3, B3) while Saxony-Anhalt is rather active in 
the Committee (A13, B13). An explanation for these different attitudes towards the CoR 
using my independent variables could not be found. It might be a case of path dependency 
that, for instance, Bavaria or Baden-Württemberg today realize the limited influence of the 
CoR but still uphold its formal importance because these two Länder were among the most 
fervent advocates of a strong CoR in the first place (Jeffery, 1995, p. 254). Berlin, on the 
other hand, never called for a stronger CoR and is today lukewarm at best about its 
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usefulness (A3). Variance is therefore given because some states make the political decision 
to concentrate on CoR work but even they know of the low influence on policy. 
 
Associations 
Under the broad headline of associations, two groupings emerge: One cluster is made up of 
European special interest groups, business associations, labor unions and companies while 
the other consists of regional lobby groups (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998, pp. 229-230; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 88; Tatham, 2008, pp. 508-509). The respondents all in all 
confirmed these two classifications which is why I will divide this short section accordingly. 
 Since partnerships in general are regarded as crucial in Brussels, it is always good to 
have more actors backing a certain demand. Securing support from business associations or 
companies can therefore be helpful, which is why no respondent discarded working with 
associations. Usually, this cooperation is sought out in Brussels and organized according to 
policy fields where interests converge. For example, Berlin is in contact with corporations 
having sites in the city (A3). Bigger Brussels offices may host events with associations or 
companies (A1, A2, A9, A10, B10, B13), with the biggest being approached by associations 
rather than the other way around (A1, A2, A9). Such meetings are a source of income for the 
offices (A2) but also a networking opportunity. The respondents from Saarland pointed out 
that business associations or other special interest groups possess unparalleled technical 
expertise in a certain field and tend to benefit from sizable resources (A11, B11). Thus, 
associations are another information provider and it “can’t hurt to have connections to them 
because they have the on-site manpower” (B11). But compared to the Commission or the EP, 
the possible impact of this information exchange is even more indirect and diffuse. 
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 Besides these existing associations, regions can also form their own networks. Such 
groups can be based on similar policy interests or geography. For instance, Saxony-Anhalt 
was instrumental in bringing about the European Chemical Regions Network (ECRN; A13) 
and Hesse was a founding member of Nereus, the Network of European Regions Using 
Space Technologies (B6). Both networks include other German states as well (European 
Chemical Regions Network, 2012; Nereus, 2012). Similarly, Baden-Württemberg is heavily 
invested in establishing the Danube Partnership (A1, B1; see also Reinhart, 2009, 2011) and 
Bavaria works closely with regions in neighboring member states (A2). Inter-regional 
networks aggregate regional demands and thus put the regions in a stronger position towards 
EU institutions. One important such network is the previously mentioned REGLEG. 
 All respondents called contacts with various associations important. It emerged from 
the interviews, however, that like the CoR, they are not considered an absolutely 
indispensable channel for interest representation. The earlier finding that associations may be 
used to access Commissioners directly and to bypass other routes of interest representation 
(Tatham, 2008, p. 509) was not validated. Only two respondents even mentioned a link-up of 
associations with the Commission (B6, A13). So, again, like the CoR, it might be a strategic 
political decision to zone in on such interest-based cooperation rather than a decision 
influenced by the independent variables explored in this paper. 
 
Other channels 
Only respondents from Hesse mentioned their state’s involvement with the ECJ and the 
European Council (A6, B6). The Land has an office in Luxembourg and as an observer tries 
to follow along the judicial processes. One goal is to be present here as well and another aim 
is to bring information back to the Land because ECJ decisions impact the regional level as 
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well. Hesse also engages with the European Investment Bank and the European Financial 
Stability Facility. 
 The European Council is the pinnacle of intergovernmentalism so there are no formal 
access points for anyone but the central states’ leaders. One interviewee from Hesse did point 
out, nonetheless, that for topics of major importance, if anything, party political connections 
could work (B6). For example, CDU politicians see each other at least twice a month for 
regular party meetings so if there is an issue of urgent significance, a prime minister could 
approach the chancellor more easily than a politician from the opposition party. This happens 
only on extremely rare occasions and is a very weak and diffuse way of regional interest 
representation. Therefore, the European Council and the ECJ were not part of this research. 
 
Summary 
All Länder use the same supranational channels in Brussels with the same intentions for each 
and the same knowledge of how the channels could work for them. No variance was detected 
here along the independent variables. For instance, all states work in the same way for early, 
direct, personal, informal access to the Commission. 
 There is, however, variation in what the states achieve when working the channels – 
or at least what they think they can achieve. Presumably strong Länder such as Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg, Hesse or North Rhine-Westphalia with relatively large populations, a 
high GDP per capita, low levels of per capita debt and smaller shares of the ERDF were 
sometimes mentioned as the most powerful actors by interviewees from other states. 
Respondents from Berlin, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland or Thuringia would more 
readily acknowledge that they are “but a very small cog in a big wheel” (A3). Some Länder 
treat interest representation with a more confident mind-set and attitude due to their 
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resources. Other Länder can compensate for their assumed weakness by focusing on policy 
areas that they know they are vital players for and by forging strong and committed networks 
through entrepreneurship (Jeffery, 2000, p. 18). 
Successful interest representation through the channels is therefore not only a matter 
of resources but also of personal contacts and commitment. 
 
4.2 Regional vs. Federal Level: Case Study on the Structural Funds 
Negotiations 
This paper included the independent variable “conflicting interests between the regional and 
federal level” in order to explain possible changes in channel selection. For example, it could 
have been that the Commission is only or more often used if there are conflicting interests 
with the federal government. And indeed, a more intense involvement and a more intense 
search for allies were mentioned if there is conflict (B2, B4, B5, B11). But the respondents 
overall said that conflicting interests do not affect channel selection – even in such a 
fundamental zero-sum case as budget negotiations. This underlines the robustness of my 
previous finding that there is little variation in channel preferences among the Länder. 
Possible conflict between regional and federal level should not be disregarded, 
though. In this brief case study, I will present the negotiations surrounding the structural 
policies as an example of conflicting interest representation and its consequences. The basic 
argument is that the Länder and the federal government seek a common position for the 
2014-2020 budget negotiations, especially because the previous negotiation round for the 
2007-2013 budget was characterized by conflict and did not benefit Germany’s overall 
position. 
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 Respondents were asked to indicate how often it happens that regional and federal 
interests diverge, on a six-point scale ranging from never (value 1) over seldom (2), 
sometimes (3), often (4) and usually (5) to always (6) (Fowler, 1995, p. 56; found in Tatham, 
2010, p. 98). Over half of the interviewees stated it happened seldom (53.3 percent), another 
40 percent said it happened sometimes and the remaining two respondents answered with 
often (see table 3). The mean among German respondents might be a little bit higher than in 
Brussels because once a policy issue is transferred to Brussels, domestic conflicts have 
already been carried out. The statistical results have to be taken with a grain of salt because 
some respondents did not feel a quantification of this question was appropriate or provided 
an answer that did not easily fit in the scheme. What the table should show and what the 
qualitative analysis supported is that conflicting interests do occur and are not uncommon. 
 
Table 3. Conflicting interests between the regional and the federal level 
 mean* variance standard deviation 
respondents in Brussels 2.07 0.07 0.27 
respondents in Germany 2.94 0.33 0.57 
combined 2.54 0.40 0.63 
*1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = usually, 6 = always 
 
The most often named issue resulting in conflicting interests were the EU budget and 
specifically the structural funds (26.7 percent; A2, A3, A4, A5, B10, A13, B14, B16), 
rendering it suitable for this case study. Negotiating the EU budget is never easy but for the 
period of 2007-2013, an even bigger than usual rift between member states and the 
Commission appeared. The German federal government was not willing to expand the EU 
budget and in fact was aiming at paying less: It demanded a cap of the EU budget at one 
percent of the combined gross national income of the EU (BBC, 2003; Maruhn & 
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Emmanouilidis, 2005; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2003, p. 5). A controversial debate surrounding 
the 2007-2013 budget ensued, lasting until December 2005 (for overviews over this debate, 
see BBC, 2005; Begg, 2004; Feld & Schnellenbach, 2007; Miehe-Nordmeyer, 2007; Pitlik, 
2006). 
The discussion, mainly pitting net payers against net recipients and the Commission, 
was exacerbated by the looming enlargement of the EU (Lippert & Bode, 2001, p. 385). An 
expansion and reform of the structural funds was at the heart of the negotiations. One unique 
effect of enlargement on the structural funds was the statistical effect: “Regions whose GDP 
per capita slips below 75 percent of the new EU average because of the enlargement (…) will 
by and by drop out of the assistance under the [former objective 1, now] convergence 
objective.” (Seiler, 2006, p. 176) In Germany, this was a special concern for the Eastern 
Länder, as they were the only German regions receiving funds under the former objective 1. 
They were thus calling for an expanded EU budget to ensure continued support from the 
structural funds. 
An intra-national fault line appeared between the federal government and the Länder 
and even among the states themselves. The Eastern Länder were for an expansive budget to 
ensure that at least the pre-enlargement levels of funding would be kept up. Whereas the 
Commission wanted to combine certain objectives into the new convergence objective, the 
Eastern Länder wanted to retain the benefits, both financially and administratively, they 
received under the former objective 1 region status (Fester & Fuchs, 2004a, pp. 6-7; 2004b, 
p. 34). Meanwhile, the Western Länder were intent on keeping the funds they obtained as 
objective 2 and 3 regions that were to be combined into the new competition objective (p. 
34). To deal with the statistical effect which mostly concerned the Eastern Länder, the 
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Western Länder supported a phasing-out transition period. So, clearly, there were heavily 
conflicting regional and federal interests. One respondent likened the diverging budgetary 
interests of the federation and the Länder to “the two parts of the brain that are not 
connected.” (B16) 
Germany did not agree on a common position. The federal government wished to 
rally more member states behind its call for a small budget while the Länder opted for fairly 
narrow interest representation towards the EU. 
For example, Berlin could not come to agreement with the other city states Bremen 
and Hamburg because each city thought of their own individual interests first. The German 
capital consequently tried supranational contacts (A3): “Then we were looking for our 
friends and partnerships and channels outside of Germany and found them.” 
The Eastern German Länder – without Berlin – did come together in one coalition and 
approached the Commission without federal backing (A13). They published a position paper 
with eight other European regions with the general demand of keeping the objective 1 
assistance instead of introducing phasing-out regimes (Staatskanzlei Sachsen-Anhalt, 2003, 
pp. 2-3). Their argument against phasing-out was that just because statistically, the Eastern 
Länder were doing better, this was in no way related to an improvement on the ground. A 
reduction or an end to the objective 1 assistance would therefore not only hurt the economy 
but could also stir anti-EU feelings among the citizens (Staatskanzlei Thüringen, 2003, p. 4). 
Länder not covered under objective 1 had goals almost diametrically opposed to those 
positions from Eastern Germany. Bavaria, for instance, explicitly demanded that “financial 
concessions to the acceding countries and previous profiteers of objective 1 assistance should 
be limited” (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, 2004, p. 17). Enhancing the 
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objective 1 support would create bad incentives for regions that already benefit from lower 
labor costs. Instead, cross-border regions should receive special attention. 
Schleswig-Holstein, on the other hand, called for particular support for rural areas 
(Staatskanzlei Schleswig-Holstein, 2003, p. 2). Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Saarland wanted to hear nothing of rural support but stressed the importance of objectives 2 
and 3 (Länder Nordrhein-Westfalen, Saarland & Bremen, 2003, pp. 3-4). All four Länder, 
though, were for phasing-out rules to counter the statistical effect. 
In the end, the negotiations dragged on for a long time and little substantial changes to 
the structural funds regime were made except for the agreement on a phasing-out period for 
former objective 1 regions (BBC, 2005; EurActiv, 2007; Pitlik, 2006). 
For this case study, more relevant than the outcome of the negotiations is the fact that 
each of the German states or groups of them represented their own interests towards the EU. 
Germany did not speak with one voice. The country thus appeared divided, insecure and 
volatile in its demands (A2, A3, A4, A5, A8, A11, B12, A14, B14). Going alone without 
prior comprise with the federation hurt Germany’s credibility, as the three following quotes 
from interviewees from a city state, an Eastern German Land and a Southern state show: 
Bypassing the federal government “can work short-term because the Commission (…) from 
case to case is interested in playing the federal level off against the Länder. (…) Long-term, 
this extremely weakens Germany’s influence here and we all suffer from that in the end.” 
(A5) Another interviewee said (A4): 
We (…) try to coordinate with the federal level in all areas. That, of course, doesn’t 
mean that in the preliminary discussion we’re always on the same page on all issues. 
(…) It would be fatal to go against the federal level because the federal level in the 
end has more pull through its work in the Council and it would also be 
disadvantageous because Germany then wouldn’t present itself in a uniform way. 
That would be very dangerous. 
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A respondent from Bavaria invoked the allegiance to the federal level and stated that “you 
can’t go to the Commission and say, ‘Listen, the federal level has this interest but that’s not 
the Bavarian interest. We would like to have it like this.’” (A2) 
 The realization that a common German position is beneficial for negotiations leads 
over to the most recent rounds of talks. Today, Germany is much more focused on 
coordinating before going to Brussels. 
 As a result, the federal government and the Länder adamantly try to compromise and 
find a common position for the 2014-2020 budget negotiations. In the last round, the federal 
government saw that the Länder were able to assert themselves towards the Commission 
(A13) and now it is more open to cooperation, even if it might view the Bundesrat procedure 
and taking in the Länder positions as annoying sometimes (A3). The Länder, meanwhile, 
have realized that they cannot “sustain” (A8) going against the federal government, making 
German interest representation more coherent this time around. 
The federal government and the Länder, for example, comment together on 
Commission proposals or documents concerning regional policies which they did not do in 
the last negotiations. In 2009, they issued a joint statement (Bund-Länder-Stellungnahme) on 
the Commission’s “Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion – Turning Territorial Diversity into 
Strength” (European Commission, 2008). In it, they express agreement on the need for 
autonomous regional action (Federal Government and Länder, 2009, p. 1) and they answer 
questions on the very idea of territorial politics in largely concurring fashion. Similarly, a 
joint statement was issued on the Commission’s fifth report on economic, social and 
territorial cohesion (European Commission, 2010; Federal Government, 2011; Federal 
Government and Länder, 2011; German Länder, 2011). 
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The EMK has on multiple occasions declared its backing of the joint statement with 
the federal government (47. Europaministerkonferenz, 2009; 53. Europaministerkonferenz, 
2011; Europaministerkonferenz, 2009, 2011). In contrast to that, EMK publications on the 
previous structural funds debates did not mention any joint statements (32. 
Europaministerkonferenz, 2002; 33. Europaministerkonferenz der Länder, 2002). In the 
2014-2020 negotiations, then, the Commission faces a more coherent German voice rather 
than a multitude of German voices which reduces the risk of the EU institution playing the 
Länder and the federal government off against each other (B13). 
There are, however, still hurdles to a truly united federal-regional position. As always, 
the amount of money involved is up for debate. The federal government continues to insist 
on the one percent cap for the EU budget (Federal Government, 2011, p. 15; also B13). This 
demand most certainly did not find its way into the states’ part of the statement. Besides, the 
federal government considers conditionality for the assistance “an interesting way forward” 
(Federal Government, 2011, p. 7), as long as it does not encroach on member state 
competences. The Länder are opposed to any conditionality (German Länder, 2011, p. 7). 
Moreover, interviewees from four Länder did let it shine through that, generally, they 
are not willing to back down from either the Commission or the federal government (B1, A6, 
B6, A7, A9, B9). Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and to a lesser extent Baden-Württemberg 
and Lower Saxony all seem to have a more assertive stance towards the EU, with a self-
image of being a strong independent player. The respondent from Hesse said that “the goal is 
always to speak with one voice but the Hessian interests have to be taken into account. 
Otherwise we have to assert ourselves alone or with others, that’s important.” (A6) His 
colleague from North Rhine-Westphalia concurred (A9): 
 54  
We always go to the Commission first. We don’t hide behind the back of the federal 
government but we act in our interests. (…) If the federal government has a position 
different from ours, then we take note of that. That certainly doesn’t make our work 
easier but it also doesn’t stop us, either. 
So, consensus is not always a given. Since the budget negotiations usually do not 
enter a crucial phase until the proverbial last minute, tensions at a later stage – both between 
Germany and the Commission and within Germany – are a possibility. Yet, the short analysis 
of the two latest budget and structural funds negotiations shows that there has been a learning 
curve for both the federal and the regional level: Confrontational, solely independent interest 
representation and regular bypassing do not seem to be considered accepted and promising 
methods by either the federal or regional actors. 
  
 
5. Conclusion 
The Länder have multiple avenues in both the national and the supranational setting to 
represent their European interests and are thus part of a MLG “system of continuous 
negotiation along nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks, 1993, p. 392). 
 Domestically, they mainly use the Bundesrat to influence Germany’s position in the 
Council. At the EU level, the Commission is by far the most important channel, followed by 
the EP. Only little divergence was found in what channels the states use, at least regarding 
the independent variables explored in this study. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that 
conflicts of interest with the federation do not seem to play a role in channel selection, a 
finding backed up by the case study. 
 The results of using the channels vary, though. Generally, resource-rich Länder are 
more likely to use all of the channels examined in this study more frequently and more 
successfully. However, policy success only partly depends on resource richness. The weight 
each Land has in dealing with the channels in Brussels also differs based on the quality of its 
personal contacts and its perceived importance in certain policy fields. Because of difficulties 
in measuring this variable, this key finding has to be seen as an encouragement for future 
research. 
All German states use the same set of channels in Brussels, suggesting that here, the 
institutional set-up of German federalism overrides socio-economic differences. How they 
utilize these channels, though, is determined by socio-economic factors such as resources, 
contacts and commitments. 
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Appendix: Interview Questionnaire 
I. Begrüßung und Forschungsanliegen 
II. Hintergrund 
1. Wie viele Menschen arbeiten in Ihrem Büro? Vollzeit vs. Teilzeit? 
2. Wie beurteilen Sie die personellen Ressourcen Ihres Büros? 
III. Einstellung zur EU-Interessenvertretung 
3. Wie wichtig ist die Interessenvertretung bei der EU für Ihr Land? 
a. im Vergleich zu anderen Aktivitäten des Landes 
b. im Vergleich zur Interessenvertretung für EU-Angelegenheiten beim Bund 
4. Was sehen Sie als Hauptaufgabe Ihres Büros? 
a. Einfluss ausüben (z.B. auf Gesetze; Regionssichtweise erklären) 
b. Verbindungsglied zu Bürgern in Region (z.B. EU erklären; EU-Kontakte 
vereinfachen) 
c. Informationsaustausch (z.B. Infos von EU bekommen; Aufmerksamkeit über 
Region stärken) 
5. Gibt es bei den meisten EU-Angelegenheiten eine klare Position Ihres Landes? 
6. Kommt der Anstoß zur Interessenvertretung meist aus Ihrem Land oder als Reaktion 
auf EU-Vorhaben? 
7. Wenn Sie eine EU-Entscheidung beeinflussen möchten, was ist dann typischerweise 
das Vorgehen? (Rangfolge?) 
a. eigene Position auf EU-Ebene durchsetzen 
b. regionale Partner gewinnen, um Position auf EU-Ebene durchzusetzen 
c. eigene Position zu Deutschlands Position machen 
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8. Wenn es eine Position gibt, die Ihr Land von sich aus auf EU-Ebene vertreten 
möchte, was ist dann typischerweise das Vorgehen? (Rangfolge?) 
a. eigene Position auf EU-Ebene durchsetzen 
b. regionale Partner gewinnen, um Position auf EU-Ebene durchzusetzen 
c. eigene Position zu Deutschlands Position machen 
IV. Kanäle zur EU-Interessenvertretung 
9. Bitte sagen Sie mir, inwiefern Sie die folgenden Kanäle zu Ihrer Interessenvertretung 
nutzen (wann welchen? welches Ziel? Rangfolge?): 
a. Ministerrat 
b. Kommission 
c. Europäisches Parlament 
d. Ausschuss der Regionen 
e. Brüsseler Ländervertretung 
f. Assoziationen 
10. Wenn Sie versuchen, die Position Ihres Landes auf EU-Ebene durchzusetzen, 
berücksichtigen Sie dabei für gewöhnlich die Position Deutschlands? 
11. Wie häufig kommt es vor, dass die regionalen Interessen Ihres Landes anders sind als 
die der Bundesrepublik? 
a. nie 
b. selten 
c. manchmal 
d. oft 
e. meistens 
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f. immer 
12. Wenn Sie wissen, dass Ihr Land eine andere Position vertritt als die Bundesregierung, 
inwiefern beeinflusst dies die Wahl der Kanäle? (Rangfolge?) 
VI. Dank und Abschied 
13. Möchten Sie noch etwas ergänzen? 
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